Thomas's "10 steps to an argument" in practice

I thought I would see whether Thomas's "Ten Steps to an Argument" would work in practice. This is not how I usually work but I'm always open to trying new things. My notes on the process itself are in brackets.

T: The practice of literary criticism should be based on the principle of receptivity: an openness to the greatest products of the human intelligence; the problem of literary criticism, then, is how to translate the experience of this receptivity into acceptable scholarly arguments that do not betray it too much.

What I want my audience to do with this: I want them to be convinced that this way of framing the problem of scholarship in the humanities should supersede more conventional views. I want them to understand that this is already what they aspire to do, even if they don't know it yet.

Three sentences about why my audience is not able to do this:

(1) Paradigms for research in the humanities emphasize the application of grand theoretical schemes, not the receptivity of the reader.

(2) Moreover, an emphasis on the inherent value of the "raw material" in the humanities reminds too many people of an outmoded "Arnoldian" approach that takes for granted to value of the literary canon of "the best that has been thought and said."

(3) The main reason to anticipate resistance to my thesis, however, is that scholars in the Humanities are too eager to look for the political alibis in order to justify the importance of their work.

Step 4: write three sentences that state the background assumptions against which the sentence can be believed, agreed with, or understood
:

(13) The humanities are inherently devoted to the study of the products of human intelligence and culture; even arguments that oppose particular views of the canon (or the privilege enjoyed by particular canonical works), still take for granted the value of other kinds of cultural products.

(14) The advantage of the idea of receptivity is that it is not tied down to any particular view of what kind of works one should be receptive to, actually privileging receptiveness to work outside one's own zone of comfort.

(15) The ideal of receptiveness is thus sufficiently broad to outweigh the suspicions of Arnoldian elitism.

Step 5: write three sentences that state your direct evidence for T. Number them 7, 8, 9.

[Gee, I thought up my thesis with no supporting evidence at all; I'm going to have to scramble a bit here]

(7) The paradigm I am proposing is already at work in the most satisfying existing scholarship, which opens up "channels of reception" rather than shutting them down.

(8) We feel, intuitively, that the best scholars are finely attuned "receptors" rather than mere accumulators of information.

(9) The value of scholarship depends, logically, on some notion of being able to transform the raw materials of the humanities into convincing arguments.

Step 6: write three sentences that explain how someone whose mind looks like 1,2,3 would be convinced of 7, 8, 9. Number them 4, 5, 6.

[This step is freakin' hard!]

(4) Some scholars might not realize that there is even a better way of doing things; these should be exposed to the debate in the way I am framing it.

(5) Many scholars already probably distrust their own working paradigms but lack the perspective to transcend them; they need to hear an eloquent statement of what the real aim of work in the humanities ought to be so they can clarify their own aims.

(6) Even if some scholars are not convinced by my arguments here, they will be able to fine-tune their own practices by becoming more conscious of some underlying issues at stake.

Step 7: write three sentences that explain why someone who knows 7, 8, 9 will henceforth assume 13, 14, 15. Number them 10, 11, 12.

[Piece of cake; child's play; easy as pie. First I have to go back and look at 6 other sentences.]

(10) Since the principles I am proposing are already inherent in the best practices of scholars, there is no obstacle left standing in the way of the acceptance of my thesis.

(11) The only plausible obstacle would be the accusation of Arnoldian elitism, but the principle of receptivity is the polar opposite of this.

(12) The only thing they (Mayhew's principle of receptivity and Matthew Arnold) have in common is the assumption that there is some value to human culture that makes it worth studying.


Now we order the sentences like so and have an epiphany:

Paradigms for research in the humanities emphasize the application of grand theoretical schemes, not the receptivity of the reader. Moreover, an emphasis on the inherent value of the "raw material" in the humanities reminds too many people of an outmoded "Arnoldian" approach that takes for granted to value of the literary canon of "the best that has been thought and said." The main reason to anticipate resistance to my thesis, however, is that scholars in the Humanities are too eager to look for the political alibis in order to justify the importance of their work.

Some scholars might not realize that there is even a better way of doing things; these should be exposed to the debate in the way I am framing it. Many scholars already probably distrust their own working paradigms but lack the perspective to transcend them; they need to hear an eloquent statement of what the real aim of work in the humanities ought to be so they can clarify their own aims. Even if some scholars are not convinced by my arguments here, they will be able to fine-tune their own practices by becoming more conscious of some underlying issues at stake.

The paradigm I am proposing is already at work in the most satisfying existing scholarship, which opens up "channels of reception" rather than shutting them down. We feel, intuitively, that the best scholars are finely attuned "receptors" rather than mere accumulators of information. The value of scholarship depends, logically, on some notion of being able to transform the raw materials of the humanities into convincing arguments.

Since the principles I am proposing are already inherent in the best practices of scholars, there is no obstacle left standing in the way of the acceptance of my thesis. The only plausible obstacle would be the accusation of Arnoldian elitism, but the principle of receptivity is the polar opposite of this. The only thing they (Mayhew's principle of receptivity and Matthew Arnold) have in common is the assumption that there is some value to human culture that makes it worth studying.

The practice of literary criticism should be based on the principle of receptivity: an openness to the greatest products of the human intelligence; the problem of literary criticism, then, is how to translate the experience of this receptivity into acceptable scholarly arguments that do not betray it too much.


The humanities are inherenlty devoted to the study of the products of human intelligence and culture; even arguments that oppose particular views of the canon (or the privilege enjoyed by particular canonical works), still take for granted the value of other kinds of cultural products. The advantage of the idea of receptivity is that it is not tied down to any particular view of what kind of works one should be receptive to, actually privileging receptiveness to work outside one's own zone of comfort. The ideal of receptiveness is thus sufficiently broad to outweigh the suspicions of Arnoldian elitism.

That took me just over an hour and I would give myself about a C-. The sentences are not at all well-written; the argument is still weak, largely because of the lack of clarity in the prose itself and the fact that the sentences do not flow into each other. To really do this well would have taken probably four hours I don't have right now. The advantage I see with this method is that it forces you to make certain assumptions explicit, thinking very deliberately about how to get your audience from where it is to where you want it to be. The feeling of not knowing how to do this is very bracing.